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This article reviews recent developments within a number of aca-
demic disciplines pointing toward an increasing importance of 
imagination for understanding morality and cognition. Using ele-
ments from hermeneutics and metaphor theory, it works toward a 
framework for a more context-sensitive understanding of human 
agency, especially focusing on moral deliberation and change. The 
analytic framework is used to analyze the story of a patient making 
tough decisions in the context of prenatal diagnosis. We show how 
a relatively stable outlook on the world, here called the “baseline 
of choice,” is challenged by unexpected events and how imagina-
tive processes enter into the active creation of a new moral order. 
The ensuing interpretation is then placed within a broader philo-
sophical landscape. John Dewey’s notion of “dramatic rehearsal” 
is put forward as one particularly promising way of understanding 
moral imagination, deliberation, and decision-making.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During the past 30 years, the discipline of bioethics has come to play a 
prominent role in commenting on and framing decision-making processes 
in health care and life science research. Still, significant doubts remain 
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regarding the adequacy of its models of agency and decision-making pro-
cesses, especially in terms of moral change. Although bioethics is a diverse 
field, this inadequacy may be particularly acute in situations where models 
are imported from analytic philosophy. Although there seems to be no lack 
of critique directed at some of the central presuppositions laid down in 
works such as Principles of Biomedical Ethics by Beauchamp and Childress 
(2012), alternative models of decision making and change somehow fail to 
engage the minds of most bioethicists or policy makers. The main paradigm 
presented by bioethics textbooks—in what we will refer to as “mainstream” 
bioethics—remains that of the rational actor basing his/her choices on sound 
scientific advice, thereby optimizing health and well-being through the exer-
cise of autonomy (cf. Veatch, 1984; Ahronheim, Moreno, and Zuckerman, 
2000; Freeman and McDonnell, 2001). Although not wanting to enter into 
a detailed discussion of the adequacy or shortcomings of such models, we 
nevertheless wish to provide an alternative account of decision-making and 
moral change, oriented toward the point of view of the patients involved in 
clinical settings. We base our account on the presupposition that imagina-
tion in most cases plays a far more central role to moral deliberation and 
change than is commonly recognized within mainstream bioethics (either 
“principled” or empirical approaches). Because representations of past and 
present situations, as well as prospective action, come with moral impact for 
the agents involved, we argue for an ethical understanding of “moral imagi-
nations.” A focus on moral imagination is considered important to better 
understand the complexity of patients’s biomedical choices, providing more 
plausible descriptions of the decision-making process and moral change. 
In this text, we show, using one concrete case, how imagination plays a 
decisive role in the moral change of one patient facing difficult choices. 
While underlining that we are not really putting forward a theory here, we 
nevertheless introduce some concepts that can be used for grasping such 
processes. We also use these to reflect on the implications of our results for 
understanding moral context within hermeneutically oriented philosophies. 
In addition, we think that our approach adds an important didactic value in 
understanding moral deliberation and change in medical contexts from the 
perspective of lay persons and patients. Finally, we place our analysis within 
a pragmatic analytic framework of action with reference to John Dewey’s 
notion of “dramatic rehearsal.”
II. THE RELEVANCE OF IMAGINATION
Let us begin with a brief look at the theoretical side. Although rarely dis-
cussed as such within bioethics, a growing literature from a number of fields 
provides evidence for our claims about the central role of the imagina-
tion for agency and the decision-making process. The (alleged) antagonism 
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between reason and imagination is indeed nothing new; it lies at the very 
heart of the relationship between Romanticism and the Enlightenment, so 
central to the western intellectual tradition (cf. Berlin, 2006; Rorty, 2007). 
Throughout the 20th century, many of the Romantic views were reinter-
preted by philosophers of hermeneutics and pragmatics (cf. James, 1950; 
Gadamer, 1960; Ricoeur, 1977; MacIntyre, 1984; Dewey, 1922), often placing 
explicit emphasis on various functions of the imagination for reason and 
morality (cf. Castoriadis, 1987; Tuan, 1989; Fesmire, 2003; Elliot, 2005). In 
addition, and partly building on these traditions, novel approaches are now 
emerging within cognitive linguistics, analyzing the work of the imagination 
mainly through recourse to the concept of metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson, 
1980; Lakoff, 1993; Johnson, 1994). Recently, strong claims have been put 
forward that central concepts, that is, “the metaphors we live by,” are intrin-
sic to the physiological processes of the neural system and the brain and 
so can be studied as part of neurolinguistics (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; 
Feldmann, 2008). These developments may provide more concrete empirical 
insight into processes traditionally relegated to the realm of the theoretical, 
or (even) the speculative. Hence, it is claimed that “. . . work in a number of 
fields is converging toward the rehabilitation of imagination as a fundamen-
tal scientific topic, since it is the central engine of meaning behind the most 
ordinary mental events” (Fauconnier and Turner, 2003, 14–15).
A related point concerns the character of health care information. Dealing, 
as it does, increasingly with possible futures of real or potential patients, 
even the most rigorous realist cannot deny the relevance of the imagination 
to decisions made by patients and other users of health care services. In the 
light of the strong criticism of bioethical models of agency, coupled with 
mounting challenges for genomic and preventive medicine decision-making 
in years to come, a thorough focus on imagination could make important 
contributions to the understanding of theoretical, practical, and technologi-
cal challenges.
III. A MODEST TOPOGRAPHY OF THE IMAGINATION
As a first approximation to the question regarding what imagination is, we 
may paraphrase Parmenides: “Consider how the absent (things) are with 
certainty present to thought” (quote from Castoriadis, 1997). That is, the 
imagination makes present to us that which is absent by giving to it shape 
and form (Kant, 1968, A 118). Another way of phrasing this would be that 
the imagination oscillates between the real (or factual) and the possible. In 
the words of Dewey, “imaginative vision elicits the possibilities that are inter-
woven with the texture of the actual” (Dewey, quoted in Fesmire, 2003, 68). 
By itself, it is intimately bound up with the exploration of possible action 
and with choices between differing possible courses of action. In situations 
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of great moral difficulty, the “possible” emerges as an imaginative response 
to a situation in which the moral agent seems (to him-/herself) to be stuck 
in what the Greeks termed an aporetic situation, that is, great perplexity and 
doubt. In the sections that follow, we briefly describe some prominent forms 
through which the imagination can be conceptualized: image, metaphor, 
social imaginary, and narrative. We use these concepts to describe some 
basic features of the broader concept of imagination.
By images, we mean something akin to common notions of imagination: 
images that people see “in their mind’s eye.” As we enter into culture and 
start to interact and communicate with other people, we necessarily develop 
images of the self and of the body (cf. Mead, 1934). The body, being the 
precondition for perception and experience (Merleau-Ponty, 1962), cannot 
itself be directly grasped (cf. Jenkins, 2004). Through images, established 
through social interaction, our body is seen as something else. This leads us 
on into the realm of metaphor. Metaphor, according to Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980, 5), entails “understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms 
of another.” It is the transfer of cognitive structure and meaning from one 
conceptual domain to another, in which the origin (the “source domain”) 
is used to make sense of the new domain (“target domain”). Lakoff and 
Johnson (1999) also proceed from the presupposition that concepts are situ-
ated bodily. Our basic concepts, indicating phenomena such as direction, 
color, objects, and movement, all stem from interaction with the world and 
other people. The expressions “I go through the door” and “the cat is on the 
mat” are not metaphorical. But when concepts are transferred to domains 
of experience other than the ones in which they arose, concept and experi-
ence are no longer identical and the phenomenon of metaphor arises. Thus, 
the expression “I go through a hard time” is based on metaphorical reason-
ing. Knowledge of the physical act of passing through something (a door) 
has been transferred to a more complex setting, including one’s emotional 
state. The metaphor resides in the shared structure possessed by the two 
phenomena, centrally the image of a relatively stable structure (a door or 
an emotional state) through which one passes. The work of the imagination 
here consists in the drawing of inference patterns between the two domains 
of experience, and the general conceptualization of this process is accom-
plished in the form of an image. Thus, says Lakoff (1993, 229), “abstract 
reasoning is a special case of image-based reasoning.”
Passing from individual consciousness to that of the collective brings us 
to the concept of social imaginaries. A social imaginary must be sufficiently 
stable to make up a relatively coherent outlook on the world, including 
conceptions of moral order. When shared by a sufficient number of agents, 
the social imaginary becomes social reality. According to Charles Taylor, 
such ordering of reality can be grasped as “. . . the ways people imagine 
their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on 
between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and 
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the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations” 
(Taylor, 2004, 23).
Images, metaphors, and imaginaries can be articulated through narra-
tives. Everybody has an intuitive understanding of narration coming from 
their acquaintance with fairy tales, novels, and fantastic stories. According to 
Aristotle’s Poetics, narrative is the imitation of action structured into a (rela-
tively) coherent beginning, middle, and end. However, that is not all there 
is to it: parallel to the claim that metaphor is not something used in poetry 
or rhetoric only, but rather constitutive of the way we think, the claim from 
hermeneutic and other philosophers has been that narrative structure is con-
stitutive of the ways in which we exist as human beings in the world (cf. 
Gadamer, 1960; Ricoeur 1990). There is almost no way of making sense of 
any situation without telling the story of the events that led to it: “I arrived on 
the midday train from Oslo”; “He made me do it”; “Because of poverty, most 
of my family emigrated to the United States in the early 20th century.” We 
exist within complex webs of events and situations, and we make sense of 
the world and ourselves through the stories we tell about these. Paul Ricoeur 
described narrative as the active effort to bring coherence and structure 
into human life through the temporal ordering of actions, characters, and 
events. The moral relevance of this should be clear: according to MacIntyre, 
I can only answer the morally loaded question “What am I to do” if I can 
answer the prior question “Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?” 
(MacIntyre, 1984, 216) Narratives, then, can be seen as a moral medium, 
weaving interactive and intersubjective structures of meaning from the avail-
able metaphors, images, and social imaginaries.
IV. A PRENATAL DECISION STORY: THE CASE OF KATRIN
We now apply these theoretical concepts to our patient’s story. Clearly, we 
cannot really provide a patient’s story because we are not the patients our-
selves. In the paragraphs that follow, the reader finds our interpretation 
of one of our interviewee’s interpretation of what has happened to her. It 
is our own narrative of her narrative, a double hermeneutic approach (cf. 
Giddens, 1984; Smith, 2003) to illustrate what we think can be understood 
as the working of “moral imagination” in her decision-making process. At 
the end of the narrative, we will especially focus on a key metaphor in her 
story, a “metaphorical image” that seemed to help her cope with the moral 
implications of her situation.
The story that we take as our example comes from a qualitative interview 
study conducted in Switzerland between 2002 and 2006. The story takes 
place within the context of prenatal testing. It deals with a woman’s expe-
riences undergoing a difficult situation of prenatal diagnosis. We call this 
woman Katrin. Katrin was interviewed by two of us in Basel, Switzerland, 
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in the spring of 2004. The semistructured interview questions focused on 
her experiences of prenatal diagnosis, her decision-making process, and her 
coming to terms with the results. At the time of the interview, the questions 
did not specifically probe for images or imagination but for time as a factor 
in the patient’s decision-making process. Our research interest in imagina-
tion evolved later, and thus, in an additional round of interpretation, we 
reconsidered her decision-making process story in an additional round of 
interpretation considering the concepts outlined above.
Katrin, aged 44 at the time of the interview, explained that she had gone 
through her first pregnancy at the age of 38 but that there was a miscarriage. 
She then became pregnant again the same year, this time with twins. The 
pregnancy worked out well and both twins were born healthy. After the 
birth of the twins, she immediately became pregnant again. But when she 
went through ultrasound screening as part of a routine prenatal checkup, a 
serious problem emerged: an enlarged neck fold, which can be an indica-
tor of a chromosomal defect and thus of a potential disability in the coming 
child, was spotted on the screen. She was immediately offered a chorionic 
villus biopsy to identify potential genetic causes of the enlarged neck fold. 
In the interview, Katrin emphasized that she had already reflected upon the 
possibility of having a disabled child. She explained that:
In the case of Down syndrome, it would not be sufficient reason for an abortion, 
that was for me like a norm. I told my husband that [people with Downs] can take 
part in society, they can lead their own lives, they are absolutely capable of living 
their lives.
Her prior knowledge and thinking led her to suspect that what had been 
detected was indeed Down syndrome. However, her doctor thought it might 
be something else:
Then the chorionic villus biopsy was done and the doctor told me, with this size of 
neck fold I would have to expect a bad result, he had to tell me that, and he said that 
in two to three days I would know for sure. And I asked him: ‘Okay, what do I have 
to consider? Is it Down syndrome?’ ‘No, it can’t be that, if it was, the neck fold would 
not be so thick, it must be something else, probably worse.’ ‘Okay, what would that 
be?’ ‘Maybe Turner syndrome.’ And I had no idea what Turner Syndrome might be.
Then—she went on to explain in the interview—she waited for the test 
result for two days. Her fetus was then diagnosed as being affected by nei-
ther Down syndrome nor Turner syndrome, but by Trisomy 13. Trisomy 13 
is a chromosomal defect that is invariably lethal to the child. From a medical 
perspective, there was only one solution for this situation, and thus Katrin 
was immediately offered an abortion.
The people in the hospital told me to contact my gynaecologist, and he said he 
would sign me up for an abortion right away. I asked him: Why abortion, is there 
no other possibility?
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At that time, she could not imagine there being no other way out of the 
situation:
A very, very difficult time for me, and I constantly asked myself: do I have to abort 
a living child now, do I have to kill a living being?
During the interview, she also made it clear that her partner was in favor of 
the abortion, as was her father. But to her, the situation was too overwhelm-
ing, and it did not make sense at all:
Understanding that the child will never really live, but still, right now, it does live 
within me (. . .), and not having the time to come to terms with that.
In this difficult situation, with no proper support from her husband or her 
father, an additional problem that made things much worse appeared: one 
of her existing twins developed a life-threatening disease and was admitted 
to hospital. Although Katrin emphasized in the interview that she was trying 
hard to be strong, considering both the uncertainty of the current pregnancy 
and the severely ill child, she summarized her situation retrospectively by 
saying that:
I knew that I could not go through this pregnancy alone (. . .) and one big factor 
was my exhaustion, I was so exhausted.
She then decided to give in to the offer of abortion, in order to be able to 
properly take care of the sick child in the hospital. In the interview, she gave 
us a powerful description of the moment of her final decision:
I suddenly saw myself as a mother bear, I had the image, I have to care for my off-
spring, they are here now. That is the important thing now, my powers, what I have 
left, I must use them on what is, not on what might be.
Thus, Katrin uses the image of a “mother bear” as a metaphor to describe 
herself in that very situation. She finished the interview by emphasizing that 
she regretted that she had not been offered more possibilities in her difficult 
situation and that afterward, she had thought a lot about what it would have 
been like to give birth to the profoundly disabled child who would then die.
V. RECREATING MORAL ORDER
Imagining herself as a mother bear appeared to help Katrin reconstruct a 
particular version of her role as a mother, as a family member, and ulti-
mately also as a member of society. We cannot know whether she really did 
visualize herself as a bear exactly at the moment of the decision. Perhaps, 
she only used this image retrospectively in the interview, as a powerful 
metaphor to describe her former feelings and emotions. However, taking 
her statement at face value, we want to argue that the image and her identi-
fication with it might have provided her with moral guidance, and possibly 
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also with much-needed motivation, for how to proceed. Of course, we are 
not claiming that the image arose in some way independent of Katrin’s own 
moral deliberations. Rather, we suggest that she was able to create a new 
moral order for herself by imaginatively projecting her knowledge of “bear-
hood” and her connotations of that metaphor onto herself and her situation. 
A mother bear is a strong animal, and Katrin needed all the strength she 
could gather at a time of physical and emotional exhaustion. A mother bear 
fiercely protects her offspring when they are under attack. Katrin may have 
felt her unborn child to be under attack: by fate, by the doctors, and even by 
her husband. Nevertheless, her living children were also in danger, and the 
sick one in particular was in need of her protection. She then decided that 
“. . . my powers, what I have left, I must use them on what is, not on what 
can be.” Then, two days before she received the final diagnosis, she had told 
herself to “mobilize her powers” in the face of the challenges to come, that 
is, to take care of the child in her womb. Thus, the image may be seen to 
have captured the energy already mobilized, but re-channeled it toward her 
other children. In our interpretation, Katrin aligns herself with those aspects 
of the mother bear metaphor that encompass her sense of desperation, of 
defiance, and of focusing on immediate concerns—the real children—as an 
animal would do. Hence, it is not that the image generates a solution, but 
that the image becomes the focal point for the creation of a new moral order. 
There is nothing “irrational” about the aspects highlighted in this leap of the 
imagination: the unborn child is important but not as important as the one 
in the hospital. That realization helps Katrin to reach a decision in a situa-
tion that she had never before experienced, a situation for which she lacked 
moral and experiential precedents: a new moral order was created by Katrin 
through the heuristic use of the image of the bear.
VI. REIMAGINING THE SOCIAL AND MORAL CONTEXT
We have already started to use some of the theoretical concepts, that is, 
image and metaphor, in order to interpret Katrin’s account of her choice. We 
now move toward some of the broader concepts in order to try and make 
more sense out of the wider context of that choice. First, we suggest that one 
reason why she experiences the situation as especially hard is the moral out-
look she has on the world: she sees the world as holding a place for every 
child, including profoundly disabled ones (cf. her first quote above). This is 
the social imaginary within which she begins her process of choice and in 
which she, through narrative, makes sense of her own social role. It seems 
reasonable that her narrative of her moral self in that situation would go 
something like: “I am the kind of person who will defend the right of every 
child, including severely disabled ones, to be born and to have a place in 
society.” Let us call this particular outlook on the world the baseline of her 
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choice; it is the general background against which she makes sense of her-
self within the wider social and moral order. This order has a relatively stable 
form, that is, it is a social imaginary, as described earlier. Its status as a social 
imaginary may be seen as constituted in two ways: first, it is Katrin’s specific 
outlook on how society and human relations are and ought to be. Second, 
it is a view on the world that many other people also hold: even if not uni-
versally held, it has a social and historical existence and is not restricted to 
the “private” morals of one person. It is realistic in the sense that it, in many 
cases, actually guides both individual and collective action. The moral order 
as imagined by Katrin corresponds to real alternatives in the real world.
However, the course of events seriously challenges her world view. The 
viability of that particular imaginary that is her particular version of a moral 
order and its corresponding narrative of self is called into question. This real-
ization emerges from a chain of events, triggered by the diagnosis, but that 
by itself does not cause the crisis that Katrin experiences. Critical features of 
the situation change as the lack of support from her family becomes clear 
and when her other child, the twin, becomes seriously ill. These features 
ensure that Katrin feels she has few alternatives but to choose the option of 
termination. This she does, but she does so in a specifically creative way, 
one that opens up the prospect of emerging from the situation with her 
moral self and dignity more or less intact.
We are of course aware that we have chosen a case example that could be 
seen to favor the particular kind of interpretation that we are making here. 
Still, we believe the case of Katrin can be seen as representative of both a 
more general capacity of creative world making and the role of the imagi-
nation in difficult moral decisions. A situation that seems impossible in its 
moral implications and complexities is transformed through the image of the 
mother bear. In a sense, the image condenses the situation and Katrin’s role 
in it: both are transformed in the same process. This makes a world of dif-
ference, insofar as that movement also opens up prospects for future action 
where previously those prospects were in conflict with Katrin’s vision of her 
moral identity. What we termed the baseline of choice has also thereby been 
transformed: Katrin’s social imaginary is no longer a world in which there is 
a place for every child and in which her role as a mother is consistent with 
that. Her moral self is kept intact through the focus on other morally laud-
able aspects of motherhood.
This observation of the reconfiguration of the greater whole through a 
smaller part may be seen to go against certain (rather conservative) pre-
suppositions made by central thinkers within hermeneutic theory. Both 
MacIntyre (1984) and Taylor (1989, 1992, 2004) seem to presuppose the 
existence of a broad and general background: the social imaginary or nar-
rative of self that resides as a lasting structure and that forms the telos of 
moral action and choice. This broader background cannot be changed; both 
MacIntyre and Taylor seem to imply the existence of a greater moral order 
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that informs choice but is not greatly informed by, or changed by, individual 
choice. Katrin’s image of the mother bear will probably not reside strongly 
in her everyday consciousness; it is more likely to have served as a kind of 
heuristic of transition for that situation. What may very well be irrevocably 
changed, however, is her outlook on the world as a place where there is 
a place for every child. This provides us with a view of the imagination as 
more active, more radically constitutive, of moral order than that implied by 
MacIntyre and Taylor. In the sense that every individual’s understanding of 
social order contributes to the social imaginary, Katrin’s mental transforma-
tion may be part of the incremental shift in the social construction of how 
women and mothers should respond to prenatal diagnostic technologies.
VII. JOHN DEWEY’S NOTION OF DRAMATIC REHEARSAL
John Dewey’s notion of imagination as exploratory action, further elabo-
rated through the notion of “deliberation as dramatic rehearsal that takes 
place in imagination” (Dewey, 1922, 190), allows us to place this interpreta-
tion within a general framework of action. For Dewey, imagination comes 
through as one central element within the larger process of decision mak-
ing and action (see Fesmire, 2003). Deliberation and imagination start from 
unexpected interference with habitual modes of behavior:
We compare life to a traveler faring forth. We may consider him first at a moment 
where his activity is confident, straightforward, organized. He marches on giving no 
direct attention to his path, nor thinking of his destination. Abruptly he is pulled 
up, arrested. Something is going wrong in his activity. From the standpoint of an 
onlooker, he has met an obstacle which must be overcome before his behavior can 
be unified into a successful ongoing. From his own standpoint, there is shock, con-
fusion, perturbation, uncertainty. For the moment he doesn’t know what hit him, as 
we say, nor where he is going. (Dewey, 1922, 181)
Following this, our everyday habits consist of relatively stable and repeated 
patterns of action, accompanied by notions of the world that are also stable 
and so remain, by and large, unexamined. We normally do not have to think 
about them. The central roles of both deliberation and imagination only 
come to the fore when such stable patterns of action, thought, and emo-
tion come into conflict, where our course is blocked. In the case of Katrin, 
such a blockage developed through several stages, notably in the discovery 
of the enlarged neck fold and the subsequent diagnosis of the sick twin. In 
such situations, activity shifts from the external environment of the everyday 
life to the inner stage of the imagination: “activity is turned from execution 
into intra-organic channels, resulting in dramatic rehearsal” (Dewey, 1922, 
191). On the inner stage, there appears the imaginative testing out of dif-
ferent courses of possible action: “Deliberation is an experiment in finding 
out what the various lines of possible action are really like” (Dewey, 1922, 
 Moral Imagination and Patients’ Decision-Making 169
190). Katrin passes through two stages of “dramatic rehearsal.” First, there 
is the situation in which she considers a number of possible diagnoses. At 
this stage, the medical doctors and her gynecologist set the premises of 
deliberation, and the implication is the (possible) “killing” of her own child. 
She then realizes that all the available diagnoses present her with alterna-
tives that are likely to conflict with her moral views. In the second stage, 
she enters a period where she also realizes that she cannot go through with 
the pregnancy. The solution that emerges through the image of the mother 
bear accords with Dewey’s description of the result of deliberation, through 
which the actor/agent returns to the external world and action. “This implies 
. . . the presence of a comprehensive object, one which coordinates, organ-
izes and functions each factor of the situation which gave rise to conflict, 
suspense and deliberation” (Dewey, 1922, 195). In the case offered in this 
article, such an object emerged with great clarity and force, possibly in 
response to the urgency and gravity of Katrin’s situation.
However, the creation of that image should not be mistaken for the pro-
cess of deliberation itself. It is rather a spontaneous response arising from 
the pressure of the situation and the urgent need for action. We could say: 
deliberation considers and evaluates alternatives for action with relative 
distance and coolness and so can allow itself to play with the different 
options for action. At some point, however, deliberation must be cut short. 
In the case of Katrin, the situation is urgent and the options for choice are 
also strongly limited. The ensuing decision may be seen more as a reflex 
response than as free and reflective; indeed, it is a leap of the imagination. 
Taken together, they bring about a fundamental shift in moral order, that 
is, moral change has taken place. The image compresses the whole of the 
situation into one focal point sufficiently powerful to motivate and instigate 
action. The preceding deliberative steps enter into that process and lead up 
to it, but they do not determine it. The story, therefore, contains elements of 
deliberation, free creation, and unbending external force, and none of these 
can be reduced to another.
Clearly, imagination is not one thing, and visions of action may come 
in several forms. However, the search for relative unity of experience and 
action makes up a constitutive theme in many writings on the imagination. 
The creation of such unity can only be attained through its active use.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We started out with a number of features of the imagination: image, met-
aphor, narrative, and social imaginary. We then used these concepts to 
interpret the decision-making story of Katrin. In particular, we wanted to 
emphasize the role of the imagination in the constitution of moral views of 
self and society and for bringing about moral change: we saw how a certain 
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“baseline” of choice, that is, a moral outlook on social and moral order, 
came into conflict with events that introduced new necessities into Katrin’s 
life. Cast into a situation of exhaustion, despair, and moral doubt, and with 
rational deliberation seemingly blocked by an intractable conflict of moral 
incompatibles, she produced a certain solution to the problem, one in which 
she had to strongly revise her moral outlook on the world. The final proof of 
her new moral outlook emerged as she regained her capacities for action. In 
that sense, we may state a certain relation between autonomy as self-deter-
mination, here referring to her image of herself, and agency, understood as 
the capacity to act.
It may be argued that, in reality, Katrin had no real choice. In reality, she 
was trapped by her own body, the diagnosis given by the medical doctors, 
and the cultural and technological context in which she found herself. In 
this case, it could be argued that Katrin has not exercised autonomy in her 
imaginative redescription of herself but rather has made the best of a bad 
job: she has come to a face-saving accommodation with an act she has been 
forced to undertake. Yet, we would argue that prior to Katrin’s redescrip-
tion, the situation was an impossible dilemma of antagonistic moral impera-
tives. The redescription enabled Katrin to see her way forward so that her 
choice was congruent with her moral sense of what a mother is and does. 
Such congruence contributes to a strong sense of moral identity and hence 
agency.
The relevance for ethics should be clear. First, it made a world of differ-
ence to Katrin that she was able to actively reestablish her moral self, and 
in that sense, not give in to external pressure. Second, especially in cases 
where the determining forces are weaker than those described in this case, 
the active use of the imagination for deliberation is essential to what we 
commonly term autonomous choice.
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